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Abstract 
An efficient algorithm is presented for computing exact system and survival signatures of K-
terminal reliability in undirected networks with unreliable edges. K-terminal reliability is 
defined as the probability that a subset K of the network nodes can communicate with each 
other. Signatures have several advantages over direct reliability calculation such as enabling 
certain stochastic comparisons of reliability between competing network topology designs, 
extremely fast repeat computation of network reliability for different edge reliabilities and 
computation of network reliability when failures of edges are exchangeable but not 
independent. Existing methods for computation of signatures for K-terminal network reliability 
require derivation of cut-sets or path-sets which is only feasible for small networks due to the 
computational expense. The new algorithm utilises binary decision diagrams, boundary set 
partition sets and simple array operations to efficiently compute signatures through a 
factorisation of the network edges. The performance and advantages of the algorithm are 
demonstrated through application to a set of benchmark networks and a sensor network from 
an underground mine. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Analysing the reliability of complex networks is an important topic that has been studied 
extensively. A widely used network model is a graph where the set of vertices V represent the 
nodes to be connected (workstations, sensors etc.) and the set of edges E represent the links 
(fibre-optic cable, wireless communication connection etc.) between nodes. One of the most 
common measures of network reliability is known as the K-terminal network reliability. This 
is defined as the probability that there is a path through working edges and vertices between 
all pairs of vertices in subset K (known as the terminal nodes) of V. Two important special 
cases are the 2-terminal network reliability which measures the reliability of connectivity 
between a pair of terminal vertices and the all-terminal network reliability which measures the 
reliability of simultaneous connectivity between all pairs of vertices in the network. K-terminal 
network reliability has diverse applications, in addition to evaluating the reliability of various 
types of networked system, such as telecommunications, transport and power systems, there 
are also applications within numerous other domains such as optimal design decomposition in 
operations research (Michelena & Papalambros, 1994) and prediction of protein complex 
membership in genome research (Asthana, King, Gibbons, & Roth, 2004).  
 
The problem of computing the K-terminal network reliability for a network is NP-hard (Ball, 
1986; Valiant, 1979), even for planar networks (Provan, 1986). Various algorithms for 
computing K-terminal network reliability have been published in the literature and can be 
categorised into those that compute exact reliability such as (Hardy, Lucet, & Limnios, 2007; 
Herrmann, Soh, & Model, 2009; F.-M. Yeh, Lu, & Kuo, 2002), those that compute reliability 
bounds such as  (Brecmt & Colbourn, 1988; Jane, Shen, & Laih, 2009; Niu & Shao, 2011) and 
those that utilise Monte Carlo simulation to compute the approximate reliability such as (Botev, 
L’Ecuyer, Rubino, Simard, & Tuffin, 2013; Manzi, Labbé, Latouche, & Maffioli, 2001). 
 
The focus of this paper is the computation of exact system and survival signatures for K-
terminal network reliability rather than direct reliability computation. The system signature 
was introduced by Samaniego (F J Samaniego, 1985) as a tool for studying the reliability of 
coherent systems (Francisco J. Samaniego, 2007). Consider a coherent system of m 
components with independent identically distributed failure times. Let 𝑇𝑠 > 0 be the random 
failure time of the system and let 𝑇𝑗:𝑚 be the jth order statistic for the random component failure 
times with 𝑇1:𝑚 ≤ 𝑇2:𝑚 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑇𝑚:𝑚.  The system signature is defined as the vector 𝑞 where 
the value at index 𝑙 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝑚}, denoted 𝑞𝑙, gives the probability that the system failure time 
coincides with the lth component failure 
𝑞𝑙 = 𝑃(𝑇𝑠 = 𝑇𝑙:𝑚)  (1) 
 
The system signature has various theoretical applications in reliability engineering such as 
establishing stochastic comparisons between the reliability of different systems (Block, Dugas, 
& Samaniego, 2006; Philip J Boland & Samaniego, 2004). Coolen and Coolen-Maturi (Coolen 
& Coolen-Maturi, 2012) later introduced the survival signature which, similar to the system 
signature, fulfils the role of a quantitative model of the system reliability structure that is 
entirely separated from the random failure times of the components.  The survival signature 
has the advantage that is can be easily generalised to systems with multiple types of 
components. Let 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑚) ∈ {0,1} 
𝑚 represent a Boolean state vector for a system 
of m components with exchangeable failure times, where 𝑥𝑖 = 1 if component 𝑖 functions and 
𝑥𝑖 = 0 if it is failed. Also let 𝜙: {0,1}
𝑚 → {0,1} represent the system reliability structure 
function, defined for all 2𝑚 possible 𝑥, where  𝜙(𝑥) = 1 if the system functions with 
component states 𝑥 and 𝜙(𝑥) = 0 if it is failed. Finally, let 𝑆𝑙 denote the set of component state 
vectors with exactly l of the m components functioning (i.e. ∑ 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑙
𝑚
𝑖=1 ). The survival 
signature is then defined as the vector Φ where the value at index 𝑙 ∈ {0,1,2, … , 𝑚}, denoted 
Φ𝑙, gives the probability that the system functions given that precisely l components function 
Φ𝑙 = (
𝑚
𝑙
)
−1
∑ 𝜙(𝑥)
𝑥∈𝑆𝑙
 
 (2) 
 
Now consider the case where the m components in the system are partitioned into 𝑁𝑇 different 
types, where the 𝑀𝑗 components of type 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑁𝑇} have exchangeable random failure 
times. Note that this differs from the usual notation in the literature on survival signatures 
where K is used to represent the number of component types since K is defined as the set of 
terminal nodes of a network in this paper. Let 𝑆𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇  denote the set of component state vectors 
that contain precisely  𝑙𝑗 ∈ {0,1, … , 𝑀𝑗}  functioning components of type j (i.e. those for which 
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑗 =
𝑀𝑗
𝑖=1 𝑙𝑗 for 𝑗 = 0,1, … , 𝑁𝑇 − 1 where 𝑥𝑖
𝑗
 is the ith component of type j). Also let 
|𝑆𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇| =
∏ (
𝑀𝑗
𝑙𝑗
)𝑁𝑇𝑗=1  denote the cardinality of 𝑆𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇  and Φ̅𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇 =
∑ 𝜙(𝑥)𝑥𝜖𝑆𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇
 
denote the number of state vectors from 𝑆𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇  for which the system functions. The 
generalised survival signature, Φ, is then defined as the multidimensional array with 𝑁𝑇 
dimensions where the value at index (𝑙1 ∈ {0, . . , 𝑀1}, … , 𝑙𝑁𝑇 ∈ {0, . . , 𝑀𝑁𝑇})  in dimensions 
(1, … , 𝑁𝑇)  respectively, denoted  Φ𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇 , gives the probability that the system functions 
given that precisely (𝑙1, … , 𝑙𝑁𝑇) components of types (1, … , 𝑁𝑇) respectively function 
Φ𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇 =
Φ̅𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇
|𝑆𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇 |
 
 (3) 
Let 𝐶𝑡
𝑗𝜖{0, … , 𝑀𝑗} denote the number of components of type j in the system that function at 
time 𝑡 > 0. The probability that the system functions at time 𝑡 can be calculated using the 
survival signature and the joint probability distribution for the number of functioning 
components of each type at time t 
𝑃(𝑇𝑆 > 𝑡) = ∑ …
𝑀1
𝑙1=0
∑ [Φ𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇 𝑃 (⋂{𝐶𝑡
𝑗 = 𝑙𝑗}
𝑁𝑇
𝑗=1
)]
𝑀𝑁𝑇
𝑙𝑁𝑇=0
 
(4) 
If failure times of components of type j are conditionally independent and identically 
distributed with CDF 𝐹𝑗(𝑡) and failure times of components of different types are independent, 
then 
  
𝑃(𝑇𝑆 > 𝑡) = ∑ …
𝑀1
𝑙1=0
∑ [Φ𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇
∏ ((
𝑀𝑗
𝑙𝑗
) [𝐹𝑗(𝑡)]
𝑀𝑗−𝑙𝑗[1 − 𝐹𝑗(𝑡)]
𝑙𝑗)𝑁𝑇𝑗=1 ]
𝑀𝑁𝑇
𝑙𝑁𝑇=0
  
 (5) 
For systems containing a single component type, the system signature and survival signature 
have the simple relation 
 
𝑞𝑙 = Φ𝑚−𝑙 − Φ𝑚−𝑙−1  (6) 
 
Whilst real world networks can be topologically very complex, resulting in similarly complex 
reliability structure functions, the edges in networks are often similar (e.g. in the case of a 
communications network, all edges may use the same cable technology). In such cases, it is 
often appropriate to use the same reliability model for all or many edges making them natural 
subjects for analysis using signature theory. 
 
There are numerous applications for reliability signatures of networks, a few of which will now 
be described briefly. Once a signature is computed, the reliability of the network for given edge 
reliabilities can be computed very quickly through Eqn. 4 or Eqn. 5. This is advantageous when 
repeated analysis of a system is required, for example in the analysis of real time systems, 
importance measure analysis and optimisation problems. Signatures can also represent the 
reliability of networks where the failure events of edges of the same type are exchangeable 
dependent and the random failure times of components of different types are dependent 
(Eryilmaz, Coolen, & Coolen-Maturi, 2018). The majority of existing algorithms for 
computing K-terminal network reliability, such as the algorithm from Hardy et al. (Hardy et 
al., 2007), rely on the stronger assumption that all failure events are statistically independent. 
The exchangeability assumption is often relevant in practical problems, for example where 
failures of edges result in increased stresses placed on those that remain working or are 
influenced by common environmental factors. Aslett et al. (Aslett, Coolen, & Wilson, 2015) 
recently presented a method for Bayesian inference of reliability under such exchangeability 
assumptions using the survival signature and 2-terminal network examples. For situations 
where analytical solution through Eqn. 4 or Eqn. 5 is infeasible, simulation can be used to 
derive system reliability from the survival signature (Patelli, Feng, Coolen, & Coolen-Maturi, 
2017). Signatures can also be used to compare the performance of different system and network 
designs (McAssey & Samaniego, 2014; F. Samaniego & Navarro, 2016; Francisco J. 
Samaniego, 2007), such as to determine if there is a uniformly optimal network design (e.g. in 
terms of stochastic or hazard rate ordering of the survival distributions) for a given number of 
vertices and edges independent of the reliability of the edges. This type of analysis results in 
the development of fundamental knowledge on the design of efficient and reliable networks in 
the real world.  
 
Existing methods for the computation of signatures for K-terminal reliability have relied on the 
computation of cut-sets or path sets and the inclusion-exclusion expansion, sum of disjoint 
products or domination theory (P. J. Boland, Samaniego, & Vestrup, 2003; Francisco J. 
Samaniego, 2007). However, the enumeration of cut-sets or path sets in a network (Fard & Lee, 
1999; W. C. Yeh, 2006) is notoriously expensive and therefore practical application of these 
methods is limited to relatively small networks. Reed (Reed, 2017) recently introduced an 
efficient method for computation of signatures from an ordered binary decision diagram (BDD) 
representation of a reliability structure function. In this paper, an algorithm for the exact 
computation of system and survival signatures for K-terminal network reliability in undirected 
networks is presented under the assumption that only edges are unreliable whilst vertices are 
perfectly reliable. The algorithm combines the ideas from Reed (Reed, 2017) for signature 
computation from BDDs with those from BDD based K-terminal network reliability methods 
(Hardy et al., 2007; Herrmann et al., 2009; Imai, Serine, & Imai, 1999; F.-M. Yeh et al., 2002) 
to enable signature computation for larger networks than previously feasible. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the theory for the 
algorithm, Section 3 presents some benchmark results on its performance when applied to 
numerous benchmark K-terminal network reliability problems commonly used in the literature, 
Section 4 demonstrates the analysis of a sensor network from an underground mine and Section 
5 discusses these results and gives some concluding remarks. 
2. Theory  
2.1. Existing BDD based algorithms for computing exact K-terminal network reliability 
Factoring algorithms, based on the repeated decomposition of the network at each edge into 
two sub-networks, the first assuming the edge has failed and the second assuming the edge is 
functioning, have been shown to be more efficient than cut or path set enumeration techniques 
(Page & Perry, 1989; Theologou & Carlier, 1991; Wood, 1986). However, these methods do 
not merge isomorphic sub-networks to avoid redundant computations and are computationally 
expensive for larger, more complex networks. Imai et al. (Imai et al., 1999), Yeh et al. (F.-M. 
Yeh et al., 2002), Hardy et al. (Hardy et al., 2007) and Herrmann et al. (Herrmann et al., 2009) 
presented algorithms for computing K-terminal network reliability using BDD to efficiently 
represent the edge factorisation of the reliability structure function, resulting in a significant 
improvement in computational performance over the earlier algorithms. 
 
BDD (Bryant, 1986) are a data structure that has been widely used in reliability engineering 
for efficient representation, manipulation and reliability evaluation of Boolean reliability 
structure functions, for example in fault tree analysis (Rauzy, 1993). They are based upon 
Shannon decomposition theory (Shannon, 1938), where the Shannon decomposition of a 
Boolean function f on Boolean variable 𝑥𝑖 is defined as 
 
𝑓 = (𝑥𝑖 = 1) ∧ 𝑓𝑥𝑖=1 ∨ (𝑥𝑖 = 0) ∧ 𝑓𝑥𝑖=0  (9) 
where 𝑓𝑥𝑖=𝑣 is 𝑓 evaluated with 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑣.  
 
A BDD contains two terminal nodes that represent the Boolean constant values 1 and 0. Each 
non-terminal node represents a sub-function g, is labelled with a Boolean variable v and has 
two outgoing edges. By applying a total ordering on the m Boolean variables for function f by 
mapping them to the integers 1, … , 𝑚, and applying the Shannon decomposition recursively to 
f, it can be represented as a binary tree with m+1 levels. Each intermediate node, referred to as 
an if-then-else (ite) node, at level 𝑙 ∈ {1, … , 𝑚} (where the root node is at level 1 and the nodes 
at level 𝑚 are adjacent to the terminal nodes) represents a Boolean function g on variables 𝑥𝑙 , 
𝑥𝑙+1, … , 𝑥𝑚. It is labelled with variable 𝑥𝑙 and has two out edges called 1-edge and 0-edge 
linking to nodes labelled with variables higher in the ordering. 1-edge corresponds to 𝑥𝑙  = 1 
and connects to the node representing 𝑔𝑥𝑙=1, whist 0-edge corresponds to 𝑥𝑙 = 0 and connects 
to the node representing 𝑔𝑥𝑙 =0. In addition, the following two rules are applied to eliminate 
redundancy: 
1. Isomorphic subgraphs are merged. 
2. Any node whose two children are isomorphic signifies that the value of the Boolean 
variable labelling the node does not influence the value of the Boolean function that 
the node represents. Such nodes are eliminated by replacing the node by its child 
node. 
To construct the BDD representing K-terminal network reliability, a total ordering is given to 
the edges 𝑒1 < 𝑒2 < ⋯ < 𝑒𝑚. The root node corresponds to the full network and its two child 
nodes represent the sub-networks assuming functioning and failure of edge 𝑒1. The 
decomposition process is then continued, with the child nodes at level l in the BDD 
representing the sub-networks resulting from the additional decomposition of edge 𝑒𝑙−1. If the 
sub-network resulting from the decomposition results in all K terminal vertices being surely 
connected, then it is represented by the terminal 1 node, whilst if it results in the at least 1 
terminal vertex being surely disconnected from any other then it is represented by the terminal 
0 node. Thus at level l of the BDD, edges from 𝐸𝑙 = {𝑒1, … , 𝑒𝑙−1} are decided (either failed or 
functioning) and the corresponding sub-networks represented by the BDD nodes at that level 
comprise only edges from 𝐸?̅? = {𝑒𝑙, … , 𝑒𝑚}.  To efficiently evaluate the network state and 
identify isomorphic sub-networks during the BDD construction, the method from Carlier and 
Lucet (Carlier & Lucet, 1996) for representing sub-network topologies as partitions of certain 
vertices is used. The use of vertex partitions during BDD construction was used by Imai et al. 
(Imai et al., 1999) for all-terminal network reliability and Hardy et al. (Hardy et al., 2007) for 
K-terminal network reliability. At level l of the BDD, the boundary set 𝐹𝑙 ⊆ 𝑉 is the set of 
vertices incident to at least one edge from 𝐸𝑙 and at least one edge from 𝐸?̅?. To represent sub-
networks, the boundary set is split into partitions where: 
 Vertices x and y of 𝐹𝑙 are in the same partition if and only if they have merged into a 
single vertex due to the decided edges in 𝐸𝑙.  
 A partition is marked with an asterisk if at least one of the K terminal vertices has been 
merged with one of the vertices from that partition. 
Two sub-networks at level l are isomorphic and represented by the same BDD node if they 
have identical boundary set partitions (Imai et al., 1999). Additionally, if all K terminal vertices 
are connected in the same partition then the network surely functions, whilst if any of the K 
terminal vertices are disconnected in a partition then the network surely fails. 
 Once the BDD is constructed, the K-terminal network reliability of the network represented by 
a BDD node can be computed in a recursive manner from the reliability of its child nodes. 
Therefore, by caching the reliability value for each node to avoid repeat computation, a 
computation time that is linear with the number of BDD nodes is achieved. The pseudo-code 
algorithm for this procedure is shown in Figure 1. 
  
 
compute_network_reliability(f, QR): 
inputs: 
f: BDD node at level l of the BDD representing the structure function for the K-terminal network 
reliability to be computed, f = (el = 1) ∧ fel=1 ∨ (el = 0) ∧ fel=0. 
QR: hash table of (key:g, value:r) pairs where g is a BDD node and r is its computed reliability. This 
should be empty on initial (non-recursive) call.   
output: 
Reliability of the network represented by the BDD, i.e. P(f = 1). 
 
algorithm:  
if f is terminal 1 node: 
  return 1 
else if f is terminal 0 node: 
  return 0 
else if f is in QR: 
  return value from QR with key f 
end if 
 
𝑅1 ← compute_network_reliability(𝑓𝑒𝑙=1, QR) # 𝑓𝑒𝑙=1 is the 1-edge child node of f. 
𝑅0 ← compute_network_reliability(𝑓𝑒𝑙=0, QR) # 𝑓𝑒𝑙=0 is the 0-edge child node of f. 
R ← 𝑃(𝑒𝑙 = 1) × 𝑅1 + 𝑃(𝑒𝑙 = 0) × 𝑅0 
Insert (key:f, value:R) into QR  
return R 
 
Figure 1 – Pseudo-code algorithm for computing the K-terminal network reliability of a network represented by a BDD.  
 
Even so, the size of the BDD for a large network can be huge (for example, 65 million BDD 
nodes for a 12 by 12 grid network (Hardy et al., 2007)) and require large amounts of memory.  
Herrmann et al. (Herrmann et al., 2009), introduced the idea of computing and storing 
reliability values in the BDD nodes during construction, enabling child node reliabilities to be 
computed directly. In this approach, each BDD node is processed only once and discarded after 
processing such that only a maximum of 2 complete levels of the BDD need to be stored at any 
time, leading to reduced memory requirements.  
 
2.2. New algorithm for computing signatures for K-terminal network reliability 
A new algorithm for computing exact signatures for K-terminal network reliability will now 
be described. It combines the approach from Herrmann and Soh (Herrmann et al., 2009) for 
memory efficient construction of the BDD with methods introduced by Reed (Reed, 2017) to 
achieve efficient computation of the signature for each BDD node as it is encountered. As in 
Reed (Reed, 2017), the algorithm utilises multidimensional array data structures with NT 
dimensions and length Mi+1 in dimension j to represent survival signatures, where the value 
stored at index (𝑙1, … , 𝑙𝑁𝑇) of the array corresponds to Φ𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇  or Φ̅𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇 . Signatures for 
systems with large numbers of components and component types can comprise of huge 
numbers of elements, resulting in very large arrays that require significant amounts of memory 
to represent computationally, for further details see Reed (Reed, 2017). 
The algorithm utilises the following three operations on these arrays: elementwise addition, 
elementwise division and shift-j. The elementwise addition of two arrays A and B, denoted 
𝐴 ⊕ 𝐵, outputs an array C that has the same size as 𝐴 and B (i.e. same number of dimensions 
and dimension lengths), where the value at each index in array C is equal to the sum of the 
values at the same index in arrays A and B. Elementwise division of array A by array B, denoted 
𝐴 ⊘ 𝐵, outputs an array C that has the same size as 𝐴 and B, where the value at index in array 
C is equal to the value at that index in array A divided by the value at that index in array B. The 
shift-j operation on array A by integer j is denoted 𝐴 ⊛ 𝑗, where A is a multidimensional array 
with 𝑁𝑇 dimensions and 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑁𝑇}. It returns an array B that has the same size as A, where: 
 the value in B at each index (𝑙1, … , 𝑙𝑗 , … , 𝑙𝑁𝑇), except where 𝑙𝑗 = 0, is equal to the 
value from A at index  (𝑙1, … , 𝑙𝑗−1, … , 𝑙𝑁𝑇); 
 the value in B at each index (𝑙1, … ,0, … , 𝑙𝑁𝑇) is equal to 0. 
The pseudo-code for the main algorithm and a sub-routine it uses are shown in Figure 2 and 
Figure 3 respectively. The BDD construction procedure then follows that from Hermann and 
Soh (Herrmann et al., 2009) using network edge factorisation and boundary set partitions to 
identify isomorphic BDD  nodes. However, a state vector count array (representing Φ̅ from 
Eqn. 3) is computed and stored for each BDD ite node and for the network functioning instead 
of reliability values. An array is initially created with the value 0 everywhere and assigned to 
variable S. This array represents Φ̅ corresponding to the network functioning (i.e. existence of 
a path through working edges between all K terminal nodes) and is updated during the edge 
factorisation process. A second array is also created with value 1 at index 0,…,0 in dimensions 
0,…,NT and value 0 elsewhere, this is assigned to variable S0 and represents Φ̅ for the BDD 
root node. The state vector count array operations that were defined above are then utilised by 
the algorithm during the edge factorisation process to compute the arrays representing Φ̅ for 
each ite node. The shift-j operation is used to update an array from the parent node to account 
for an additional component of type j that functions in the edge factorisation, whilst the 
elementwise addition operation is used to add the state vector count from a parent BDD node 
to that of a child node. When the edge factorisation results in the certain connection of the K 
terminal nodes, the array containing the state vector counts from the parent BDD node is first 
updated to account for the possible functioning or failed state of each edge at higher levels in 
the BDD since they do not influence the reliability of the network given the states of the already 
decided edges. This is performed by the sub-routine given in Figure 3, and the updated array 
is then added to the array for the state vector counts for the terminal 1 node. Once the edge 
factorisation is complete or no new child nodes were created from the BDD nodes at a level, 
the final operation in the main algorithm is to use the elementwise division operation to 
normalise the final state vector count Φ̅  corresponding to the network functioning by an array 
representing |𝑆𝑙1,…,𝑙𝑁𝑇 |, which is computed from the shape of the survival signature array, to 
obtain the array representing the final survival signature Φ for the K-terminal network 
reliability. In the case of 𝑁𝑇 = 1, the simple transformation from Eqn. 6 can be used to compute 
an array representing the system signature from the array representing the survival signature. 
  
 
Compute signature(G, K, edge_types) 
inputs:  
G: network (V,E) with edges ordered from 1 to m. 
K: set of K-terminal vertices. 
edge_types: hashset of (key:e, value:j) pairs for each and every edge e from E where j∈{1,…,NT} is the 
component type of e. 
output:  
Survival signature as array with NT dimensions and length Mi+1 in dimension i where value at index 
(𝑙1, … , 𝑙𝑁𝑇) gives K-Terminal network reliability of G when (𝑙1, … , 𝑙𝑁𝑇) edges of component types (1,…,NT) 
function. 
algorithm: 
Qc ← empty hash table 
Qn ← empty hash table 
S0 ← Array with NT dimensions and length Mi+1 in dimension i with value 1 at index 0,…,0 in dimensions 
0,…,NT and value 0 elsewhere. 
part ← [] 
Insert (key:part, value:S0) into Qc  
l ← 1  
S = Array with NT dimensions and length Mi+1 in dimension i with value 0 everywhere. 
while l ≤ m and Qc not empty: 
  el ← edge at level l in the ordering 
  compute Fl+1 
  for each (key:partnode, value:Snode) pair in Qc: 
    # Create boundary set partitions for failure (removal) of el. 
    part0 ← boundary set partitions in function of partnode, Fl+1 and elevel=0 
    # Create boundary set partitions for success (contraction) of el. 
    part1 ← boundary set partitions in function of partnode, Fk+1 and el=1 
    jl ← value from edge_types with key el 
    if all K vertices in same partition in part1: 
      S1 ← update for missing levels(Snode, G, edge_types, l+1) 
      S1 ← S1 ⊛ jl 
      S ← S ⊕ S1 
    else if not empty marked partition in part1: 
      S1 ← Snode 
      S1 ← S1 ⊛ jl 
      if part1 in Qn keys: 
        Scurrent ← value in Qn with key part1 
        Update value in Qn with key part1 to Scurrent ⊕ S1 
      else: 
        Insert (key:part1, value:S1) into Qn 
      end if 
    end if 
    if all K vertices in same partition in part0: 
      S0 ← update for missing levels(Snode, G, edge_types, l+1) 
      S ← S ⊕ S0 
    else if not empty marked partition in part0: 
      S0 ← Snode 
      if part0 in Qn keys: 
        Scurrent ← value in Qn with key part0 
        Update value in Qn with key part0 to Scurrent ⊕ S0 
      else: 
        Insert (key:part0, value:S0) into Qn  
      end if 
    end if 
  end for each  
  qc ← qn 
  qn ← empty hash table 
  l ← l + 1 
end while 
N ← Array with NT dimensions and length Mi+1 in dimension i where value at index (𝑙1, … , 𝑙𝑁𝑇) is ∏ (
𝑀𝑖
𝑙𝑖
)𝑁𝑇𝑖=1   
return S ⊘ N 
Figure 2 – Pseudo-code for main routine for computing the survival signature of K-terminal network reliability. 
  
 
update for missing levels(S, G, edge_types, from_level) 
inputs:  
S: Array with NT dimensions and length Mi+1 in dimension i that is to be updated. 
G: network (V,E) with edges ordered from 1 to m. 
edge_types: hashset of (key:e, value:j) pairs for each and every edge e from E where 𝑗 ∈
(𝑙1, … , 𝑙𝑁𝑇) is the component type of e. 
from_level: the first missing level in the BDD. 
output:  
Array with NT dimensions and length Mi+1 in dimension i that represents S after updating for 
edges at the missing levels. 
algorithm: 
for n from start_level to m: 
  en ← edge at n in the ordering 
  jn ← value from edge_types with key en 
  S ← S ⊕ (S ⊛ jn) 
end for 
return S 
Figure 3 – Pseudo-code for sub-routine used by algorithm from Figure 2 to update array for missing levels in BDD. 
Computational Complexity 
Theorem: The computational complexity of the algorithm is 𝑂 (𝑚. 2𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝐵𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 . (𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 +
(
𝑚
𝑵𝑻
)
𝑵𝑻
)), where 𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum size of the boundary set and 𝐵𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the Bell number 
of 𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥.   
Proof: The number of BDD nodes at level 𝑙 is bounded by the theoretical maximum number 
of marked partitions which is given by 2𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝐵𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 (Hardy et al., 2007), whilst the size of a 
signature array is bounded by (
𝑚
𝑵𝑻
+ 1)
𝑵𝑻
 (Reed, 2017). For each BDD node, the two 
corresponding  child node partitions for  level 𝑙 + 1 must be computed which is O(|𝐹𝑙|) (Hardy 
et al., 2007) and the signatures corresponding to each of these partitions are updated through  a 
small number of elementwise addition and shift-j array operations for which the complexity is 
approximately proportional to the number of array elements and therefore O ((
𝑚
𝑵𝑻
+ 1)
𝑵𝑻
). 
The computation time complexity is therefore 𝑂 (𝑚. 2𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝐵𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 . (𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 + (
𝑚
𝑵𝑻
)
𝑵𝑻
)) whilst 
the memory complexity is 𝑂 (2𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 𝐵𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 . (
𝑚
𝑵𝑻
)
𝑵𝑻
) since signature arrays are stored at a 
maximum of two levels of the BDD at any time. 
 
2.3. Example for Wheatstone bridge network 
To illustrate the algorithm, it was applied to the Wheatstone bridge network shown in Figure 4 
that has 5 edges of 2 component types. The BDD computed by the algorithm with edges ordered 
𝑒1 < 𝑒2 < 𝑒3 < 𝑒4 < 𝑒5, where each ite node is labelled with its boundary set partitions and 
array for the state vector counts (representing Φ̅ from Eqn. 3) of the survival signature, is shown 
in Figure 5. The terminal 1 node is labelled with the array representing Φ̅ for the network 
functioning. 
 
va
vb
vc
vd
e1
e2 e5
e4
e3
Type 1 – {e1, e3}
Type 2 - {e2,e4, e5}
 
Figure 4 – Bridge network with two terminal nodes (shaded) and two edge component types. 
 
 
Figure 5 –BDD computed by the algorithm for the Wheatstone Bridge network from Figure 4, where each node is labelled 
with its boundary set partitions and array for the state vector counts ?̅? of the survival signature. Dashed edges represent 
failure of the edge and solid edges represent functioning of the edge. 
 
3. Benchmark Results 
The algorithm introduced in the preceding section was applied to the computation of the system 
and survival signatures for 11 different K-terminal network reliability problems that have been 
previously used for benchmarking algorithms in the literature. Since the problems from the 
literature all assume a single component type for the edges, additional variations of each 
problem were created that have two and three component types for the edges with an 
approximately equal number of components of each type.  
 
Table 1 shows the times for the computation of the system (𝑁𝑇 = 1 ) and survival signatures 
(𝑁𝑇 = 2 and 𝑁𝑇 = 3 ) for the “net2_8”, “net.19” and “Network (5)” networks from Yeh et al. 
(F.-M. Yeh et al., 2002), four 𝑊𝑥𝑁 grid networks (“8x8”, “12x12”, “3x12” and “3x100”) from 
Hardy et al. (Hardy et al., 2007) and four 𝐾𝑊, 𝑛 fully connected networks (“K10”, “K12”, 
“K7,15” and “K7,50”) from Herrmann et al. (Herrmann et al., 2009). All measurements were 
obtained on a standard desktop PC with an Intel i3 3.4Ghz processor and 8GB RAM using a 
breadth first search order for edges. For the 12x12 and K12 networks with 𝑁𝑇 ≥ 2 and 𝑁𝑇 = 3 
respectively, the signature could not be computed due to insufficient memory (RAM). 
 
Table 1 – System and survival signature computation times for benchmark K-terminal network reliability problems. 
Network |𝑽| |𝑬| |𝑲| CPU Time 
with 𝑵𝑻 = 𝟏 
(seconds) 
CPU Time 
with 𝑵𝑻 = 𝟐 
(seconds) 
CPU Time 
with 𝑵𝑻 = 𝟑 
(seconds) 
net2_8 16 24 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
net.19 20 30 2 0.02 0.03 0.07 
Network (5) 20 30 9 0.02 0.03 0.07 
8x8 64 112 2 0.34 1.56 19.90 
12x12 144 264 2 130.23 N/A * N/A * 
3x12  36 57 2 0.00 0.00 0.01 
3x100 300 497 2 0.01 0.53 42.78 
K10,10 10 45 10 0.08 0.15 0.55 
K12,12 12 66 15 1.96 4.65 N/A * 
K7,15 15 69 15 0.04 0.06 0.2 
K7,50 50 279 50 0.37 2.52 92.70 
 
The 𝑁𝑇 = 3 variations of the “net2_8” and “Network (5)” networks are shown in Figure 6 and 
their computed survival signatures are given in Appendix A. 
                                                 
*The computer used to perform the computations had insufficient memory (RAM) to compute the signature. 
 
Figure 6 – Two of the benchmark networks with 𝑁𝑇 = 3 where edges are labelled with the component type and terminal 
nodes are shaded. 
 
4. Application to analysis of the reliability of a RFID wireless sensor network 
This section describes the application of the algorithm to analyse reliability of a radio-
frequency identification (RFID) sensor network at an underground mine. The network enables 
the location of personnel and mobile assets fitted with RFID tags to be tracked as they operate 
within the mine, increasing productivity and safety. RFID sensors and wireless routers are 
located strategically within the production areas of the mine and communicate with one another 
via short-range radio link to form a wireless mesh network. One of the routers is connected via 
wireless connection to a server that forms part of a wired network. When an RFID tag passes 
within range of a RFID sensor, a data packet containing the unique ID codes belonging to the 
tag and sensor along with the current time is generated by the sensor and sent over the wireless 
network to the server. The transmission protocol used ensures that a data packet generated by 
a sensor will reach the server if there exists at least one path between the sensor and the server 
through available node to node wireless connections. On receipt of a data packet, the server 
updates the last known location of the person or asset, which can then be viewed by mining 
staff on computer terminals connected to the server via the wired network. The topology of the 
wireless network, comprising 62 nodes (including 57 sensor nodes) and 96 wireless network 
connections between nodes, is shown in Figure 7.  The wireless network connections between 
nodes in the network may temporarily fail due to radio-frequency (RF) interference created by 
machinery and equipment used in the mine, such as electric motors and personal dust monitors. 
In such cases, the nodes will attempt to re-establish the connection until it is restored. Failures 
of the nodes themselves (sensors, routers and the server) are negligible in comparison and are 
not considered in the analysis.  
 
 
Figure 7 – Topology for the wireless RFID sensor network. 
 
The level of the overall RF interference in the mine varies depending on the current activities 
and its normalised value, such that a value of 0 represents the minimum level of interference 
and a value of 1 represents the maximum level, is modelled as a random variable with a Beta 
distribution with shape parameters 3.8 and 5.3, as shown in Figure 8.  
  
Figure 8- Plot of the probability density function (PDF) for the normalised level of RF interference in the mine. 
 
A wireless connection between a sensor and a sensor or router is denoted as a type 1 connection 
and the probability it is failed, 𝐹1, is modelled by the following Gompertz function of the 
normalised level of RF interference in the mine 𝑧:   
 
𝐹1(𝑧) = 0.0013𝑒
−5.5𝑒−3.5𝑧  
 
Whilst a wireless connection between a router and a router or the server is denoted as a type 2 
connection and the probability it is failed, 𝐹2, is modelled by the following Gompertz function 
of the normalised level of RF interference in the mine 𝑧:   
 
𝐹2(𝑧) = 0.0002𝑒
−7.7𝑒−4.1𝑧  
 
There are 91 type 1 wireless connections and 5 type 2 wireless connections in the network. The 
parameters in the two failure probability models differ due to the different technologies used 
for the two types of wireless connection. Figure 9 shows a plot of the probability that each type 
of wireless connection is failed against the normalised level of RF interference in the mine.  
 
Figure 9 – Plot of the probability of a wireless link being failed against the normalised level of radio-frequency (RF) 
interference in the mine. 
 
The aim of the analysis is to determine the reliability of the simultaneous availability of a path 
along functioning wireless connections between a specified subset of the RFID sensors in the 
network and the server at a random time. This is therefore a K-terminal reliability problem 
where the K terminal nodes consist of the server and the subset of sensor nodes. The reliability 
of the connection between the server and each of the following three subsets of sensors from 
Figure 7 will be considered: all sensors, sensors numbered 48 to 61 (these sensors cover a single 
production area at the mine) and sensor 1.  
 
Due to the common dependence between the failure probabilities of wireless connections and 
the level of RF interference in the mine, algorithms that assume independent edge failures, such 
as (Hardy et al., 2007; Herrmann et al., 2009), are unsuitable. However, it follows from the 
modelling assumptions that the failure events of edges representing wireless connections of the 
same type are exchangeable dependent whilst the failure events of edges representing wireless 
connections of different types are dependent. A survival signature for the network with two 
component types can therefore be computed for each of these three cases using the algorithm 
that was introduced in Section 2.2 of this paper (these signatures are given in Appendix A). 
The computation of each signature took approximately 10 seconds on the computer used for 
the benchmark tests with a breadth first search edge ordering starting from the sensor node 
labelled 1 in Figure 7. The K-terminal reliability for the network at random time 𝑡, 𝑅𝑡, can then 
be calculated for each case from its survival signature Φ : 
  
𝑅𝑡 = ∑ ∑ [Φ𝑙1,𝑙2𝑃(𝐶𝑡
1 = 𝑙1, 𝐶𝑡
2 = 𝑙2)]
5
𝑙2=0
91
𝑙1=0
 
(10) 
 
The probability that exactly 𝑙1 and 𝑙2 of the type 1 and type 2 wireless connections, 
respectively, are failed in the network at random time 𝑡 is given by: 
 
𝑃(𝐶𝑡
1 = 𝑙1, 𝐶𝑡
2 = 𝑙2) = (
91
𝑙1
) (
5
𝑙2
) ∫ 𝑓(𝑧)[𝐹1(𝑧)]
91−𝑙1[1 − 𝐹1(𝑧)]
𝑙1[𝐹2(𝑧)]
5−𝑙2[1 − 𝐹2(𝑧)]
𝑙2𝑑𝑧
1
0
 
 
(11) 
 
where 𝑓(𝑧) is the probability density function of the normalised level of RF interference in the 
mine. This integral was approximated numerically for each combination of 𝑙1 and 𝑙2 using the 
tanh-sinh quadrature algorithm (Bailey, Jeyabalan, & Li, 2005)  and the computed values are 
given in Appendix A. The following K-terminal network reliabilities for the three sensor nodes 
subset cases were computed: 0.999558 for the all sensors case, 0.999944 for the sensors 
numbered 48 to 61 case and 0.999565 for the sensor 1 case. 
 
The failures of wireless network connections are conditionally independent given that the 
normalised level of RF interference in the mine is known at time 𝑡. Therefore, the probability 
that exactly 𝑙1 and 𝑙2 of the type 1 and type 2 wireless connections, respectively, are failed in 
the network at time 𝑡 when the normalised level of RF interference is 𝑧 is given by: 
 
𝑃(𝐶𝑡
1 = 𝑙1, 𝐶𝑡
2 = 𝑙2) = (
91
𝑙1
) (
5
𝑙2
) [𝐹1(𝑧)]
91−𝑙1[1 − 𝐹1(𝑧)]
𝑙1[𝐹2(𝑧)]
5−𝑙2[1 − 𝐹2(𝑧)]
𝑙2  
 
(11) 
 
Figure 10 shows a plot of the K-terminal reliability against the normalised level of RF 
interference for the three different sets of terminal nodes. Note that the plotted reliability values 
could also have been determined from the K-terminal reliability network algorithms that 
assume independent edge failures. However, the advantage of the signature approach is that 
repeating the edge factorisation and BDD construction process was not required. Instead, the 
reliabilities were calculated directly from the signatures for the different edge failure 
probabilities, making it much more computationally efficient. 
 
Figure 10 – Plot of the K-terminal network reliability against the normalised level of RF interference for the network in 
Figure 7 for three different sets of terminal nodes. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Previous algorithms for the computation of system and survival signatures for networks 
required the derivation of cut-set or path sets as an intermediate step which is computationally 
infeasible when the network is large and complex. A new algorithm was presented in this paper 
that utilises binary decision diagrams, boundary set partition sets and simple array operations 
to efficiently compute signatures through a factorisation of the network edges. The computation 
times for a set of benchmark problems from the literature demonstrate the efficiency of the 
algorithm, in many cases it was able to compute the signatures within a few seconds on a 
standard PC. The results for the 3x100 grid network show that signatures for even very large 
networks, in this case with 497 edges, can be computed in reasonable times provided that the 
maximum size of the boundary set is small. As expected, computation times are greater for 
networks with greater numbers of edges, greater boundary set sizes and greater numbers of 
signature elements. 
 
The analysis of a RFID sensor network from an underground mine using the new algorithm 
provided an example of the practical applications. Using the survival signatures computed for 
the network, K-terminal reliability values were obtained for exchangeable but non-independent 
edge failures. K-terminal reliability values for the network were also computed for multiple 
edge failure probabilities using the signatures, eliminating the need for repetition of the edge 
factorisation and BDD construction process.   
 
It was not possible to compute the signatures for a small number of the benchmark problems 
due to the memory requirement exceeding the available resources on the computer used. The 
huge memory requirement in these cases was due to a combination of a signature with a large 
number of elements, resulting from the number of edges belonging to each component type, 
and a large maximum BDD width resulting from the edge factorisation. Further research is 
needed on the development of algorithms to make it feasible to compute survival signatures for 
these cases. The presented algorithm is limited to the computation of signatures for K-terminal 
network reliability of undirected networks with unreliable edges and perfectly reliable vertices. 
The development of similar methods for networks with unreliable vertices and directed edges 
is another area for future work. 
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7. Appendix A. Supplementary Data 
 
The survival signatures computed for “net2_8” and “Network (5)” with 𝑁𝑇 = 3  from the 
benchmark networks presented in Section 3 along with the survival signatures and wireless 
connection failure probabilities from the example sensor network presented in Section 4 are 
provided as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet file. 
 
 
 
